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A PERILOUS CLIMATE:
How DOMESTIC ELECTRIC CORPORATIONS CAN MOST
ADVANTAGEOUSLY PREPARE FOR AND RESPOND
TO A POST-AMERICAN ELECTRIC EXISTENCE
John H. Spittell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the years following its discovery, global warming was commonly
viewed as an unwavering monolith; a seemingly omnipotent threat to
human existence persisting as the residual curse of the Industrial
Revolution. However, through research and education that fostered
greater public understanding of the causes of global warming, the dire
perceptions of prior generations have begun to be replaced by cau-
tious optimism that the ecological damage man begot can be tem-
pered and, in some instances, ameliorated. With confidence in hand
that global warming can not only be reduced, but eradicated entirely
provided that proper ecological practices are enacted and adhered to
by citizens, corporations, and nations as a whole, activists and politi-
cians have been hard at work, seeking a wide breadth of means by
which environmentally friendly policies can be introduced into the
popular lexicon of law. The activists' progress has been slow but
methodical; a systematic, unyielding march in a battle against the sta-
tus quo of corporate governance and the liberties provided by local
governments to corporations with respect to ambulant emissions that
are harmful to the environment.
Internationally, environmental activism has resulted in the imple-
mentation of progressive policies geared toward the reduction of
greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming via ozone deple-
tion. The focal point of the environmentalist effort at the turn of the
century was the Kyoto Protocol,' a treaty which imposed limitations
on sovereign emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol was
* B.A., Political Science & Psychology, Northwestern University, 2006; J.D., DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law, anticipated May 2011. The author wishes to thank his family for their sup-
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1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, (Dec. 10, 1997).
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adopted by a plethora of nations, yet the United States abstained.2
This desistence provided the United States with autonomy so as to
better develop a strategic option for reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions in a way conducive to domestic corporate growth.3 However,
this autonomy ultimately resulted in stagnation, as legislative proposi-
tions were consistently stultified by a strong corporate lobby and a
lack of domestic public outcry for immediate reform. Corporations
flourished in this stasis, but a move to environmentally responsible
policies was always just off the horizon. Recently, those advocating an
era of newfound corporate environmental liability for ambulant air
emissions garnered a decisive victory via the Second Circuit's contro-
versial holding in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.4
American Electric was a landmark decision, garnering much interest
in environmental as well as corporate circles. The decision, a veritable
lightning rod for controversy and squabble between corporations that
emit mass quantities of greenhouse gases and the citizens and proper-
ties impacted by these emissions, held that corporations that emit ex-
orbitant amounts of greenhouse gases that exacerbate the problem of
global warming can be held liable for damages under the common law
of nuisance.5 This Note will examine the legal ramifications resulting
from the American Electric holding with respect to corporations that
emit mass quantities of greenhouse gases and how these corporations
can respond in a fashion most beneficial to global sustainability as well
as corporate economic sustainability.
In response to American Electric, stationary power companies who
utilize technologies that emit mass amounts of greenhouse gases must
respond two-fold: (1) the corporations must prepare strategies to off-
set losses resulting from judicially-imposed remedies, and (2) the cor-
porations must alter their lobby strategies, directing efforts to
domestic legislative reform rather than international legislative re-
form. Responding effectively will allow the corporations to minimize
short-term losses and maximize long-term gains while also providing
for a reduction in greenhouse gases conducive to alleviating the Earth
of global warming.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part 1I of this Note will summarize
past instances in which environmentally offensive corporations were
held liable under the common law of nuisance. Further, it will address
2. See FACT SHEET: UNITED STATES POLICY ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, available at http://
www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/kyoto.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
3. Id.
4. 582 F.3d 309, 392-93 (2nd Cir. 2009).
5. Id.
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the procedural posture of American Electric. Part III of this Note will
discuss the process by which the Second Circuit analyzed American
Electric and ultimately reached its holding. Part IV will elaborate on
what American Electric's holding means for corporations that emit
large amounts of greenhouse gases, focusing on the calculation of judi-
cially-imposed remedies and the methods by which corporations can
create capital in order to remain solvent. Part V will utilize a histori-
cal perspective and focus on how American Electric and its residual
impact will affect corporate lobbying in the future with respect to ef-
fecting environmental regulations conducive to corporate sus-
tainability. Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Setting the Stage for American Electric
The Second Circuit's holding in American Electric has rendered cor-
porations trepidatious about the possibilities for enforcement of com-
mon law claims of nuisance against their respective plants for
contributions to environmental decline via greenhouse gas emissions.
In fact, the possibility that corporations will be found liable under this
schema is very real and will result in dire consequences for offending
corporations unless they prepare for the prospective onslaught of
litigation.
The truth is that even if stationary power company emissions are
reduced to zero, the residual effect of emissions released prior to the
cessation of emission will not be felt for years to come, and these cor-
porations must prepare to be held accountable for impending lawsuits
under the common law of nuisance. In planning for worst case scena-
rios, the corporations must determine how to best effect remedies to
the situation. Luckily for the affected corporations, American Electric
is not the first time that the courts have found that corporations may
be held liable for damages under the common law of nuisance for en-
vironmental wrongs, and so the corporations can look to the past to
plan for the future. The first such action addressing environmental
denigration worth consideration by the corporations is the 1907 deci-
sion of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper).6
1. Tennessee Copper
Tennessee Copper addressed the State of Georgia's (Georgia) action
for enjoinment against the Tennessee Copper Company (Tennessee
6. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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Copper), a Tennessee corporation.7 Georgia alleged that Tennessee
Copper was releasing noxious sulfur dioxide emissions into air that
traveled across state lines and caused a nuisance to its sovereign
lands.8 More specifically, and similar to American Electric, Georgia
alleged that Tennessee Copper's emissions were causing ecological de-
struction in five separate counties.9 The Supreme Court recognized
that immediate rectifications to Tennessee Copper's emissions could
not be effected.10 Therefore, the Court held that it would allow rea-
sonable time for corrections, but upon failure to abate the emissions,
an injunction would be imposed upon the corporation."
Eight years later, Georgia returned to the Supreme Court, alleging
that Tennessee Copper had not abated its production of noxious emis-
sions.12 In the interim between its appearances before the Court, Ten-
nessee Copper had taken active steps to remedy its past wrongs,
including installing purifying devices to reduce emissions, creating a
fund to compensate the injured, and agreeing to subject its plant to
inspections to ensure proper emissions methods were being used.' 3 In
its review, the Court took a deferential approach that favored the
prior holding and the plaintiff, imposing additional conditions of com-
pliance upon the corporation to abate its continued emissions in order
to further curb environmental harm inflicted upon Georgia.14 The
Court's relative bent towards the preservation of environmental re-
sources would become a continued theme amongst judicial holdings
against corporations involved in ecological destruction. This trend
would be reinforced in the 1972 holding of Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin (Milwaukee 1)15 and the subsequent 1981 holding of
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Milwaukee 1).16
2. Milwaukee I
Milwaukee I had a serious influence on environmental reform, ex-
panding upon the foundations created by Tennessee Copper and ad-
dressing the topic as to whether ecological destruction claims could be
litigated under federal common law. In Milwaukee I, the State of Illi-
7. Id.
8. Id. at 236.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 239.
11. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 239.
12. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
13. Id. at 476.
14. Id. at 477-78.
15. 406 U.S. 91 (1971).
16. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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nois sought to bring an action against four Wisconsin cities for ecolog-
ical harms caused by the cities' pollution of Lake Michigan, an
interstate body of water.' 7 The Supreme Court looked to a variety of
statutes in determining the adequacy of Illinois's claims, including the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).' 8 The Court deemed
it acceptable that in its consideration of litigation involving ambient or
interstate aspects, federal common law could be utilized, and such use
would not be inconsistent with the FWPCA.19 However, the Court
espoused the possibility that the creation of new federal laws and reg-
ulations could preempt the federal common law of nuisance. 20 This
final point was a major departure from Tennessee Copper, as it left the
door open for the legislature to enact novel legislation that would pro-
vide opportunity for corporations to avoid liability under the federal
common law of nuisance and thereby avoid the possibility of severe
impositions of monetary damages.
Shortly after Milwaukee I was decided, Congress enacted amend-
ments to the FWPCA that addressed the specific issue of interstate
water pollution regulation.21 Meanwhile, Illinois, rebuffed in Milwau-
kee I from bringing its action directly to the Supreme Court via origi-
nal jurisdiction, proceeded with its action against Milwaukee through
the federal and appellate courts, ultimately reaching the Supreme
Court again in the 1981 case of Milwaukee II.22
3. Milwaukee II
Milwaukee II presented the Court with a suit under federal com-
mon law by a collection of States seeking abatement of the City of
Milwaukee's sewer discharges, mirroring the same factual basis prof-
fered in Milwaukee I.23 However, the passage of the FWPCA
Amendments of 1972 altered the underlying legal platform for such
claims, rendering the federal common law of nuisance preempted.24
17. 406 U.S. at 93.
18. Id. at 101-102. The FWPCA, which has since been amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006),
declared that it was federal policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution" and that federal law
controlled the pollution of interstate or navigable waters.
19. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (1971)).
20. Id. at 107.
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2006).
22. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
23. Id. at 310.
24. Id. at 317. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(7)(b) (2006). The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 made it illegal to discharge pollutants into U.S. waters except pursuant
to a permit that incorporated specific effluent limitation regulations of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. These permits, issued either by the EPA or a similar state agency, would be
4232010]
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More specifically, the Court held that the determination of whether
federal statutory or federal common law governed started with the
assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate
standards to be applied under federal law.2 5 Furthermore, the Court
held that no federal common law remedy was available to the States,
as the restructuring of the FWPCA that gave rise to Milwaukee I sup-
planted the common law. 2 6 Therefore, the Court held that the States
could not impose more stringent effluent standards than those set out
in the amended FWPCA and vacated and remanded the action.27 Al-
though the plaintiffs in Milwaukee I and II were state actors, the hold-
ings of Milwaukee I and II were embraced by the courts and
subsequently expanded to apply to the District of Columbia, munici-
palities, and other non-state actors.28 It was in this legal environment
that the American Electric case came to fruition over three decades
later.
B. The Procedural Posture of American Electric
1. The States' Complaint
In July 2004, California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, along with the City of New
York ("the States") filed a complaint against American Electric Power
Company, Inc., American Electric Power Service Corporation, South-
ern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, and
Cinergy Corporation (hereafter collectively referred to as "the De-
fendants"). 29 The complaint, seeking relief under the federal common
law of nuisance, sought the abatement of the Defendants' continued
contributions to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and global
warming.30
The States, citing a variety of both governmental and non-govern-
mental reports, provided a causal link between the Defendants' con-
tributions to greenhouse gas concentrations and global warming, in
fact asserting a proportional relationship between the Defendants'
enforced by the respective agencies. Milwaukee operated its sewer systems under permits issued
by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.
25. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
26. Id. The Amendments were viewed by Congress as a "total restructuring" of the FWPCA.
S. COMM. ON PUBLIC WoRKs, 93RD CONG. (Comm. Print 1973) (remarks of Chairman Blatnik
of the House Committee which drafted the House version of the Amendments).
27. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 332.
28. See, e.g., City of Evansville, Ind. v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979); Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp 1203 (D.N.J. 1978).
29. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 316.
30. Id.
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emissions and the environmental injury.31 The States further averred
that the ecological changes, caused in part by the Defendants' carbon
dioxide emissions, would have a substantial negative impact on the
States' environments, residents, and property, ultimately requiring bil-
lions of dollars in restorative expenditures. 32
The States' complaint posited not only current injuries resulting
from the Defendants' emissions, but also future injuries due to befall
the States as a direct consequence of the pollution.33 The complaint
did not state the current impact of these environmental injuries upon
the States, but it did discuss the effect of the changes with respect to
future injuries, outlining a diverse range of ecologically disruptive ef-
fects upon the ecosystems of the States. 34
The States sought equitable relief, holding the Defendants jointly
and severally liable for the creation of, contribution to, or maintaining
of a public nuisance. 35 The States also sought to permanently enjoin
each Defendant to abate the nuisance by capping emissions and re-
quiring a reduction in emissions by an undetermined percentage each
year for no less than ten years.36
2. The Non-State Actors' Complaint
Concurrently with the States, the Open Space Institute, the Open
Space Conservancy, and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire
(hereafter collectively "the Land Trusts") also filed a complaint
against the Defendants.37 The Land Trusts, similar to the States,
sought to abate the Defendants' contributions to global warming.38
The Land Trusts based their claims against the Defendants on the fed-
eral common law of nuisance, or, alternatively, on "the statutory and/
or common law of private and public nuisance of each of the states
where Defendants own, manage, direct, and/or operate fossil fuel-
fired electric generating facilities."39 A principal difference between
the Land Trusts' and the States' complaint was that the Land Trusts
31. Id. at 317.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 317-18.
34. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 317-18.
35. Id. at 318.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Land Trusts are "nonprofit land trusts that acquire and maintain ecologically sig-
nificant and sensitive properties for scientific and educational purposes, and for human use and
enjoyment." These Land Trusts are comprised of nature sanctuaries, wildlife preserves, and re-
search laboratories, as well as recreational areas. The Land Trusts are also open to the public.
Id.
38. Id. at 319.
39. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 318.
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specified special injuries to their property interests. 40 Namely, the
Land Trusts stated that the global warming created in part by the De-
fendants' greenhouse gas contributions would result in a devaluation
of their land holdings while also interfering with the Land Trusts' ef-
forts to preserve the land for scientific, educational, and recreational
purposes.41
3. The District Court's Holding
In the district court, the Defendants moved to dismiss the States'
and Land Trusts' complaints on a variety of grounds.42 The Defend-
ants collectively averred that the complaints failed to state a claim
because no federal common law cause of action to abate greenhouse
gas emission existed, because separation of powers principles pre-
cluded the court from adjudicating the decision, and because Congress
had previously displaced federal common law with respect to global
warming.43 The Defendants further claimed that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over the complaints because neither plaintiff had
standing to sue on the grounds of global warming and that the lack of
standing divested the court of its federal question jurisdiction."
The district court dismissed the complaints on the grounds that the
Plaintiffs' claims raised a non-justiciable political question.45 Relying
on Baker v. Carr,46 the court held that no judicial determination could
be made with respect to the issue of whether a suit could be brought
under the common law of nuisance without an initial policy determi-
nation best suited for the non-judicial discretion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. 47
Furthermore, the district court rejected the Plaintiffs' assertions
that the nuisance claims presented in the complaints were simple nui-
sance claims previously adjudicated by the courts, holding instead that
the claims had such broad national and international implications that
the nature of the issue was inherently legislative. 48 Concluding that
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
44. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 319.
45. Id.
46. 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). Baker outlined six factors that are used to indicate the existence
of a non-justiciable political question.
47. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 319.
48. Id. at 320. Specifically, the court believed that if it granted the Plaintiffs' requested relief
and capped carbon emissions, the court would have to determine the level at which emissions
capping should occur, the percentage reduction of the emissions, the schedule for implementing
the emission reductions, the necessary implications of such relief with respect to the United
[Vol. 8:419
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the claims involved matters best situated for resolution as determined
by elected officials and that the imposition of such measures would be
tantamount to judicial fiat, usurping the powers of the legislative and
executive branches, the district court entered judgment for the De-
fendants, which the Plaintiffs timely appealed. 4 9
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S AMERICAN ELECTRIC OPINIoN
On September 21, 2009, the Second Circuit held that corporations
that emit mass quantities of greenhouse gases that exacerbate the
problem of global warming can be held liable for damages under the
common law of nuisance.5 0 In rendering its decision, the Court made
several holdings. First, the Court held that the district court erred in
dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaints on political question grounds.5'
Second, the Court held that all Plaintiffs had standing to bring their
claims.52 Third, the Court held that the federal common law of nui-
sance governed the Plaintiffs' claims.5 3 Fourth, the Court held that all
Plaintiffs stated claims under the federal common law of nuisance.54
Fifth, and finally, the Court held that the Plaintiffs' claims were not
displaced by any prior existing statute. 55 In consideration of these
holdings, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.5 6
A. Political Question Doctrine
In the Second Circuit's decision, the Court initially addressed
whether the district court was correct in holding that the Plaintiffs'
complaints were non-justiciable under the political question doc-
trine.57 In making its determination, the Second Circuit, like the dis-
trict court before it, turned to the Supreme Court holding of Baker v.
Carr.58 Upon consideration of the Baker factors, the Second Circuit
held that the district court erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs' com-
plaints on the grounds that the complaints presented non-justiciable
political questions.59
States' negotiations with other nations regarding emissions reductions, and the availability of
alternative energy resources. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 315.
51. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 390.
52. Id. at 349.
53. Id. at 369.
54. Id. at 371.
55. Id. at 387.
56. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 393.
57. Id. at 321-32.
58. Id.; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
59. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 332.
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B. Standing
As the district court had dismissed the action prior to reaching the
issue of standing, it never made a determination as to whether the
Plaintiffs could bring their claims before the court.60 Therefore, the
Second Circuit had to establish whether standing did in fact exist for
the Plaintiffs.6' The Court conducted a thorough review of the record
and ultimately found that the States had parens patriae standing and
that the States and Land Trusts had Article III proprietary standing.62
Therefore, the Court allowed the parties to proceed with the action.63
C. The Common Law of Nuisance
As the district court did not reach the issue as to whether the Plain-
tiffs stated a claim under the common law of nuisance, the Second
Circuit addressed the issue for the first time with respect to the case. 64
Current law holds that a public nuisance is an unreasonable interfer-
ence with a "right common to the general public." 65 This definition
was adopted by the Supreme Court in Milwaukee I, and has since
been used in a variety of other public nuisance cases.66 The American
Electric court accepted this definition and applied it to the facts of the
case.67
1. Determination that the States Stated a Claim
The Court first examined whether the States made a claim under
the federal common law of nuisance.68 The Defendants asserted that
principles of constitutional necessity limited the scope of the cause of
action for transboundary nuisance disputes between states and also
asserted that the federal common law of nuisance was available only
to abate immediately and severely harmful nuisances. 69 The Court,
however, found neither argument to be persuasive and held that the
States, in alleging that the Defendants' emissions constituted a sub-
stantial and unreasonable interference with the public rights of their
60. Id.
61. Id. at 333.
62. Id. at 334-40.
63. Id. at 349.
64. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 349.
65. Id. at 352 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979)).
66. Id. at 351. See also Nat'1 Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1234
(3d Cir. 1980).
67. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 352.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 353.
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jurisdictions, had adequately alleged a complaint under the common
law of nuisance.70
2. Determination that the Non-State Actors Stated a Claim
The Court then addressed whether the non-state Plaintiffs stated a
claim under the federal common law of nuisance.7' The Defendants
argued that only states could bring federal common law claims of nui-
sance and that private plaintiffs could not invoke any federal common
law cause of action to abate interstate nuisances. 72 As this was an
issue of first impression for the Second Circuit, the Court looked to
other circuits for direction.73 In so doing, the Court adhered strongly
to the Seventh Circuit's holding that municipalities could assert fed-
eral common law of nuisance claims 7 4 and the Third Circuit's holding
in National Sea Clammers Association v. City of New York75 that pri-
vate parties could bring federal common law nuisance claims.76 Upon
review of these prior public nuisance cases, the Court determined that
the non-state Plaintiffs could bring a claim.7 7
The Court next looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec-
tion 821C,78 which states, in pertinent part, who can recover for public
nuisance. 79 New York City alleged that Defendants' emissions of
greenhouse gases would ultimately increase the City's temperature,
which in turn would increase heat-related deaths, damage the coastal
infrastructure, and wreak havoc on its denizens' daily lives.80 Consid-
ering these contentions, the Court found that New York City suffi-
ciently satisfied the requirements of Section 821C.8 1 The Land Trusts
likewise asserted that the public rights of use, enjoyment, and preser-
vation of aesthetic and ecological values would be damaged by De-
fendants' emissions.8 2 Explicitly, the Land Trusts asserted a public
right to a climate that would not drastically change as a result of
greenhouse gas pollution, devastating the ecology and human popula-
70. Id. at 358.
71. Id.
72. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 358.
73. Id. at 359.
74. Id. at 359-60 (citing City of Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979)).
75. 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1980).
76. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 363.
77. Id. at 366.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821C (1979).
79. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 366.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 367.
82. Id.
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tion.83 Upon review, the Court found that the Land Trusts properly
posited an interference with a public right,84 and further held that the
Land Trusts suffered a harm different in kind or degree from that suf-
fered by the general public, as the Land Trusts' magnitude of land
ownership and general purpose were adequately different from gen-
eral public uses.85 In light of the above, the Court found that the non-
state Plaintiffs established a claim for public nuisance actionable
under the Second Circuit's purview.86
D. Displacement
Upon determining that the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a claim for
public nuisance, the Court addressed whether the Plaintiffs' claims
were displaced by federal legislation.87 The displacement standard
generally holds that federal common law is subject to the paramount
authority of Congress and that courts may only resort to federal com-
mon law in the absence of an applicable act of Congress.88 The Sec-
ond Circuit's version of the displacement test required courts to
consider whether a federal statute speaks directly to a question other-
wise answered by federal common law, as federal common law is only
used as a necessary expedient when Congress has not spoken to a par-
ticular issue.89
1. An Analysis of the Clean Air Act with Respect to the
Instant Action
The Court first considered whether the Clean Air Act (CAA) 90 dis-
placed the federal common law of nuisance with respect to the Plain-
tiffs' claims.91 In its review of whether the CAA displaced the federal
83. Id.
84. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 368-69.
85. Id. at 369.
86. Id. at 371.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981)).
89. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 374.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671 (2006).
91. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 375. The CAA requires the Environmental Protection
Agency's Administrator (Administrator) to specify criteria for air quality by determining which
air pollutants cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare and the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous
or diverse mobile or stationary sources. The Administrator thus promulgates national ambient
air quality standards ("NAAQS") to limit the amount of each specific pollutant in the ambient
air. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006). Currently, only six pollutants are regulated under the
EPA's NAAQS: sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide,
and lead. Most importantly, the EPA does not regulate carbon dioxide. See UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS, avail-
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common law of nuisance, the Court noted that no Supreme Court case
has held that the CAA displaces federal common law in the area of air
pollution.92 Further, the Court observed that the EPA failed to delin-
eate published regulations under the CAA that speak directly to the
Plaintiff's particular issue.93 Ultimately, the Court decided that until
the EPA makes the requisite findings necessary to render carbon diox-
ide a regulated pollutant under the EPA's national ambient air quality
standards, the CAA would not displace the federal common law with
respect to regulating greenhouse gas emissions or the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources. 94 Therefore, the
federal common law of nuisance applied.95
2. An Analysis of Other Domestic Legislation with Respect to the
Instant Action
The Defendants also raised the displacement defense with respect
to a series of other statutes, alleging that each statute worked to dis-
place the Plaintiffs' claims under the federal common law of nui-
sance.96 The statutes included the National Climate Program Act of
1978,97 the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987,98 The Global Cli-
mate Change Act of 1990,99 the Energy Policy Act of 1992,10 and the
Energy Police Act of 2005101.102 Upon review, the Court deemed that
all five statutes failed to address the regulation of greenhouse gas
able at http://epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). Furthermore, the CAA distinguishes
between stationary and mobile sources of air pollution. As the Defendants were immobile
sources of emissions, the Court considered them as stationary for the purposes of its analysis.
American Electric, 582 F.3d at 376.
92. Id. at 378.
93. Id. at 379.
94. Id. at 380. Of note, on December 7, 2009, the EPA Administrator signed a finding that
current and projected concentrations of six key well-mixed greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations. Carbon dioxide is one
such well-mixed greenhouse gas. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Green-
house Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
This finding is a prerequisite for future incorporation of carbon dioxide in the EPA's NAAQS.
95. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 381.
96. Id. at 381-85.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006).
98. Pub. L. No. 100-204, Title XI, H§ 1101-1106, 101 Stat. 1407, as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-
199, 107 Stat. 2327, reprinted as note to 15 U.S.C. § 2901.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921, 2931-38 (2006).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13381-388 (2006).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 13389 (2006).
102. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 381-85.
2010]1 431
432 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
emissions.103 Therefore, the Court found that the federal common
law of nuisance governed the Plaintiffs' claims.104
3. An Analysis of Displacement Due to Foreign
Policy Considerations
As a final defense, the Defendants argued that litigating the case
would effectively undermine the nation's strategy concerning global
climate change and therefore would reduce the bargaining leverage
needed by the President to implement his strategies. 05 The Defend-
ants premised this argument on the grounds that because the Supreme
Court previously held that state law is preempted when it gives the
President lesser bargaining power with other countries, the President's
ability to implement Congress's approach with respect to climate
change should displace the Plaintiffs' claims.106 However, the Court
found that this line of reasoning was a reiteration of the political ques-
tion argument. 0 7 Therefore, the Court rejected the Defendants' argu-
ment and held that the federal common law of nuisance applied to the
Plaintiffs' claims. 08
103. Id. at 387. The National Climate Program Act of 1978, the Global Climate Protection
Act of 1987, and the Global Climate Change Act of 1990 were each enacted with the purpose of
aiding in the public's understanding of and response to natural and man-induced climate
processes and their implications. The Court, recognizing that the statutes did not require actions
to limit greenhouse gas emissions, but instead were focused merely on research and public rela-
tions, determined that the acts did not directly address the issues brought forth in the Plaintiffs'
claim and therefore did not displace the federal common law of nuisance. Id.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 expanded the breadth of domestic climate legislation, focusing
not only on research and public relations, but also on planning, strategy, technology develop-
ment, assessment, and monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions. However, despite its extended
scope, the statute still did not require any explicit action directly abating emissions. As the
statute failed to specifically address the issue of remedying climate change, the Court found that
the statute did not displace the federal common law of nuisance. Id. at 384.
Finally, the Court considered the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Based on the fact that the sena-
tors, while debating the bill in Congress, stated that the bill did not include any provisions to
address global warming, the Court found that this legislation failed to displace the federal com-
mon law of nuisance as well. Id. at 385.
104. American Electric, 582 F.3d at 387-88.
105. Id. at 388.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 388.
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III. FUTURE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
wiH RESPECT TO CORPORATIONS: REMEDIES, THEIR
CALCULATION, AND THE ABILITY OF CORPORATIONS
TO COPE WITH THEIR IMPOSITION
A. A Discussion of Remedies for the Plaintiffs
Under the federal common law of nuisance, the normal procedure
upon a finding of fault by a court is to first attempt to impose an in-
junction upon the offending party until the nuisance is abated.109 If
the court determines that it would be unreasonable for a party to en-
gage in the offensive conduct without paying for the harm caused to
its surrounding community, damages may be awarded as well.110
Even if a party's action is of great utility to society, it may still be
unreasonable to inflict the harm resulting from the activity's adminis-
tration without compensating for it."'
The utility corporations affected by the holding of American Elec-
tric must actively prepare for a finding of fault by courts under the
common law of nuisance. Despite the great benefit that the corpora-
tions' actions provide to society, the corporations will have to suc-
cumb to a court's whim if the court, upon review, determines that the
ambulant air emissions discharged by the corporations constitute an
unreasonable impediment to plaintiffs' quality of life. With the afore-
mentioned considerations in mind, a discussion of the prospectively
plausible remedial measures to be imposed upon the corporations
follows.
1. Reduction of Emissions to an Acceptable Level
The first remedial measure which likely will be enforced upon the
corporations will be a mandatory reduction in emissions akin to that
imposed in Tennessee Copper.112 This reduction will need to provide
ample temporal latitude for the affected corporations so that they may
be able to install the proper corrective measures. The timetable for
compliance must reflect the level of reduction mandated by the courts,
so that, for instance, if a reduction to zero percent emissions is en-
forced, the corporations are given an adequate amount of time to ef-
fect such change. This timetable should be reasonable under both
legal and scientific review. Furthermore, any failure to comply with
the emissions reduction by the corporations should, in accordance
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B, cmt. i (1979).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
2010]1 433
434 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
with the common law of nuisance, result in the imposition of an in-
junction against the corporation until the corporation fulfills its
obligations.
2. Money Damages
An alternative remedy for the American Electric plaintiffs (and sim-
ilarly-situated parties in future litigations) would be to impose money
damages upon the defendant corporations that are in defiance of their
judicially-enforced obligations. The imposition of money damages
gives rise to a variety of issues due to the amorphous nature of calcu-
lating when environmental harm itself occurs. That is, one must con-
sider how to calculate current damages, how to calculate future
damages, and how to distribute said damages.
a. How to Calculate Current Damages
The calculation of current damages to be imposed upon offending
corporations is a tricky prospect, as the damages must be limited to a
certain extent in order to allow for the continued viability of the elec-
tric companies. These limitations exist in two different capacities:
temporal and volumetric.
First, it must be considered that the current damages will have to be
feasibly limited with respect to temporal considerations. As the law
currently stands, the date at which damages calculations would begin
to accrue for each corporation found liable would be the date at which
the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that each corpo-
ration's air emissions were negatively impacting the plaintiff.113 How-
ever, a problem is presented by the fact that it currently is not possible
to determine at what specific point in time after their release into the
atmosphere that ambulant air emissions begin to affect the environ-
ment. The corporations currently involved in the creation of ambu-
lant emissions in excess of currently acceptable levels must not be held
responsible for all harm ever effected by air pollution in the area.
Other, now defunct corporations may have previously existed that
contributed to the contemporary environmental state, and the cur-
rently offending corporations should not be held liable for actions
they did not commit. This consideration must be taken under advise-
ment by those who are charged with assessing damages to the liable
corporations so as to guarantee a fair calculation of fault. Those that
are found to be presently perpetrating a nuisance should not have to
113. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 196 (2nd Cir. 2002).
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pay for the damages caused by those that previously contributed to
the problem but no longer exist.
Similarly, equity and parity must be accorded when more than one
corporation named in a nuisance suit is found liable for damages for
harmful ambulant air emissions. If one corporation is found to have
been contributing to global warming for thirty years, and a separate
corporation also named in the action has been an equal offender for
five years, the damages should be prorated so that the latter corpora-
tion's damages are tempered to one-sixth of the former corporation's
damages.114 This temporal rationing of damages is necessary for jus-
tice to be properly served upon the respective companies.
The second factor to be considered in calculating damages is the
volume of the specific gases emitted by a company named in the nui-
sance action. This factor can be addressed relatively easily when deal-
ing with actions involving multiple parties, as a company's emissions
can be readily gauged by its internal engineers in charge of emissions
maintenance or by independently-hired scientists who specialize in the
same field. Subsequent to the compilation of data and analysis of re-
ports on the data, the total emissions contribution of each corporation
can be compared with the total emissions contributions of the other
named corporations in the action.
Upon determination of the temporal limitations and the volumetric
contribution of the offending emissions. one should divide the total
emissions by the length of time in which the emissions occurred to
establish the total contribution of each corporation. Next, the totals
should be divided against each other to determine percentage owner-
ship of the harm in order to establish the percent liability for current
damages. For example, consider a nuisance action brought against
two electric companies, Company A and Company B. Company A
emitted one hundred thousand pounds of harmful emissions over ten
years. Company B emitted one hundred thousand pounds of harmful
emissions over five years. The quotient of Company A's factors is ten
thousand, while Company B's quotient is twenty thousand. There-
fore, Company B should be forced to pay twice as much for its emis-
sions, as its rate of pollution is twice as great.
114. The one-sixth fraction is derived by placing the corporation that concomitantly offended
for the longer period of time in the denominator and placing the corporation that has concomi-
tantly offended for the lesser number of years in the numerator. In the instant example, this
results in a one-to-six ratio, providing for the reasoning that the lesser offending corporation,
whose environmental offenses occurred for one-sixth as much time as its fellow offender, should
pay a proportional amount of damages for the total time of offense.
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b. How to Calculate Future Damages
The calculation of future damages poses another difficult hurdle for
courts in determining the level of monetary compensation each corpo-
ration must pay victorious plaintiffs.115 Assuming that a plaintiff has
qualified to receive compensation for future damages, the damages
calculations should be based upon rigorous scientific and economic
analysis. Looking to past and current scientific data, such as trends of
environmental degradation at the affected plaintiffs' locations and
trends of ambulant air emissions output by the corporations, environ-
mental scientists should be able to predict a reasonable arc for the
decline of pollution levels as well as a reasonable time frame for the
prospective curative measures to have a corrective impact upon the
injured environments.116 By converting this scientific data to discrete
economic figures, that is, by calculating the specific costs of the cura-
tive measures necessary to fully effect the requisite environmental
cures, economists can determine how much successful plaintiffs should
reasonably receive as a damages award with respect to future harms.
c. How Current Damages Will Be Distributed
A variety of issues arise with respect to the distribution of damages
to victorious plaintiffs in actions for damages in tort under the com-
mon law of nuisance. First, one must consider the apportionment of
damages to be doled out amongst triumphant parties. Second, the
question of how the damages will be paid out must be addressed. Fi-
nally, one must attend to how the damages awards will be put to use
by the injured parties after the litigation concludes.
i. Apportionment of Damages
The scheme of apportionment of damages awards to successful
plaintiffs will depend on the nature of the case itself. If only one state,
municipality, or land trust is privy to the action, then the issue of divi-
115. As a prerequisite, the plaintiffs will have to adequately prove a requisite certainty or
probability that the pain and suffering will continue to occur beyond trial. See, e.g., Sw. Brewery
& Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U.S. 162, 169 (1912). Future damages claims that are merely specula-
tive or conjectural cannot be considered. See, e.g., Dunham v. Stone, 71 A.2d 412, 414 (N.H.
1950).
116. While pinpointing the specific effects of noxious ambulant air emissions is still an evolv-
ing science, scientists have been trending towards discovering more exact findings in their re-
search, especially with respect to isolating specific emissions. See A. Zubrow, L. Chen, & V. R.
Kotamarthi, EAKF-CMAQ: Introduction and Evaluation of a Data Assimilation for CMAQ
Based on the Ensemble Adjustment Kalman Filter, J. GEOPHYS. RES., 113 (2008); Jared Sagoff,
New Argonne Algorithm Increases Accuracy of Air-Pollution Predictions, (May 23, 2008), http://
www.anl.gov/MediaCenter/News/2008/EVSO80523.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
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sion of damages is moot, as the sole victor receives all of the spoils.
However, if more than one party is privy to the action as plaintiff,
then a division of damages must occur.
If the damages assessed are equivalent to the sum total of estimated
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiffs, then the apportionment is simple,
as the payouts will correspond to the damage caused. For instance, if
State A has two million dollars worth of damage, State B has three
million dollars worth of damage, and the court awards five million
dollars worth of damages, then Company A takes forty percent of the
damages award while Company B takes the remaining sixty percent.
This results in equitable recovery for each injured party.
A damages award that does not equal the sum total of damages
requested by the plaintiffs will require a more complex division of
proceeds. This division, similar to the ideology behind the rubric es-
tablished above for the calculation of volumetric contributions of
emissions, should be premised upon the relative amount of current
injury each plaintiff has at the time the damages are assessed. Exem-
plified, consider Land Trust A, which has two million dollars worth of
environmental injury. Land Trust B is inflicted with one million dol-
lars worth of injury. If the court determines that Corporation X is
liable for one and a half million dollars, then the damages award
should be split proportionately between the two land trusts - Land
Trust A, representing a two-thirds stake, gets one million dollars,
while Land Trust B, accounting for a one-third stake, receives five
hundred thousand. This apportionment scheme provides for the most
equitable result possible for each injured plaintiff.
ii. Disbursement of Damages
If the damages assessed against guilty corporations remain moder-
ate in size, it can be assumed that the corporations can disburse the
damages in a lump sum, as described in the hypothetical situations
directly above. A lump sum payment would settle the debts owed by
the corporations in one easy process, allowing the involved parties to
move past the litigation quickly and effectively. However, while in-
stances like the hypothetical situations above were limited to modest
damages awards, when such situations are applied on the macro scale
to states and large-scale land trusts, the damages awards levied against
the offending corporations could be truly massive. If the awards are
significant in nature, then the corporations may not be able to dis-
burse the damages in a lump sum, and instead may have to opt for a
structured payment plan. The purpose of opting into a structured pay-
ment plan would be to ensure that the corporations - in the instant
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case, the public necessities of utilities - would not be bankrupted by
the penalties. The structured payment plan would allow for the cor-
porations to stay fiscally afloat while making sure that they felt the
economic impact of damages upon their business. This payment plan
would have to be temporally limited in a practical fashion according to
the disposition and judgment of the court so as to make sure that the
payment plan did not extend for an unreasonable amount of time
under common logic.
iii. Limitations on How the Damages Will Be Used
One final consideration is whether the damages awards should be
limited in post-disbursement usage to public works specifically
targeted to ameliorate the environmental harm, or whether part of the
damages should be allowed to be spent by the recipients on other pub-
lic works or projects altogether. While under normal circumstances,
victorious claimants are allowed to expend damages monies on
whatever they deem appropriate, in this specific instance, due to the
direct impact the injury has on the public, it is urged that the courts
assessing these damages apply a limiting stipulation to the use of the
awards. As the cause of action was specifically tailored to remedies
sought for environmental degradation, courts should stipulate that all
monies garnered from damages awards be put towards public works
benefiting the affected agricultural areas, restoring the environment to
its proper stasis. For the plaintiffs to act otherwise would be an invita-
tion for protest and outcry by their respective denizens for improper
exercise of governmental authority, and such a conflict should be
avoided at all costs.
d. How Future Damages Will Be Distributed
With respect to future damages, the courts should apply the basic
theory delineated above regarding the allocation of damages awards
and the use to which the damages can be applied. The penalty as-
sessed to each offending corporation should be proportional to the
harm caused, and the corporations should have the choice to first pro-
vide a lump sum payment, or, if such a payment would bankrupt the
corporation, a structured payment plan should be allowed. Further,
the use of the future damages award by the corporations should be
limited solely to remedial measures directly involving the environ-
ment for the benefit of the public.
However, future damages pose the added problems of determining
what the proper level of damages is and how to properly impose the
penalty upon the offending corporations. As future events are inher-
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ently unpredictable, it is recommended that the courts embrace a de-
posit-refund system so as to provide for the most equity for the
corporations assessed with the penalty." 7 A deposit-refund system is
premised upon two fundamental tenets: that the arena of scientific
research of global warming's impact is still not an exact science, and
that the corporations should be fairly, and not unduly, penalized for
their wrongdoing." 8 Under the deposit-refund system, an adjudicat-
ing court, upon determining future damages should be assessed, would
create a trust into which offending corporations would pay the as-
sessed future damages.119 The offending corporations would then de-
posit their penalties into this trust, which would remain undisturbed
by the plaintiffs unless funds were needed to effect remedial measures
to offset the harm the corporations caused.120 If at some future point
a scientific breakthrough were to occur that would allow for the plain-
tiffs to remedy their injuries at a lesser cost than originally anticipated,
thereby rendering the initial future damages assessment to be exces-
sive, the corporations could petition the court to refund a percentage
of the monies left in the trust to their corporations.121 If, in light of
the new evidence, the court deemed the original damages to be exces-
sive, the court could then refund a reasonable amount of money to the
corporations, providing for the most just outcome possible for all par-
ties involved in the litigation.122
B. How the Affected Companies Can Remain Sustainable and How
Consumers Will Be Affected Negatively
The question of how to raise adequate capital so as to provide for
the sustainability of the major corporations involved in American
Electric is also a serious problem. More specifically, it must be consid-
ered that the damages penalties imposed upon the offending corpora-
tions could be so extensive as to be catastrophic to their respective
viability. As many of these corporations provide power to broad
swathes of consumers, thereby rendering their existence a necessary
component for the national infrastructure, their sustainability is im-
117. The premise for the deposit-refund system has been proposed as a means for dealing with
environmental lawsuits for damages in tort in the European Union. Konstantinos Tsekouras,
Exploiting the implementation potential of alternative instruments: design options for environ-
mental liability funds, in IMPLEMENTING EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEw DIRECnONS AND
OLD PROBLEMS 134, 160 (Christoph Knill & Andrea Lenschow eds., 2000).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Tsekouras, supra note 117, at 160.
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perative and cannot be compromised. If the damages imposed are
such that economic viability becomes even a remote concern, consum-
ers may be forced to share in the corporate losses indirectly.
1. Corporate Imposition of Higher Utility Prices
One such means by which the corporations could seek to raise capi-
tal to offset the judicially-imposed losses would be through the intro-
duction of higher utility rates on the public. These higher rates could
be imposed through fractional percent increases to both residential
and commercial customers. Such minimal increases would have only a
slight impact upon individual residents and businesses, but in cumula-
tion would provide for enough funds to offset corporate losses and
allow for continued operation. If measures such as fractional in-
creases are deemed necessary, the increases should be regulated by
federal law, limiting the increase to a timetable so that once the corpo-
rations reached a point at which all damages were paid and the rates
began resulting in residual gains for each corporation, the rate would
be reduced to its original state, and any residual gains would be paid
back to consumers through a surplus disbursement. In this fashion,
the electric corporations would sustain losses but remain just above
the baseline level of sustainability. Furthermore, the residual losses
accrued by consumers would be minimized as much as possible and
the states and land trusts would receive adequate compensation for
the harm caused to them by the corporations, thereby serving the pur-
pose of the damages award.
2. Imposition of a State Tax to Assist the Corporations
Another means by which the corporations could attain the funds
necessary to maintain sustainability would be through the imposition
of an electricity tax by the states in which the corporations reside.
This tax, which could be as little as a fraction of a percent, would be
applied to consumers' monthly electric intake, adding a nominal
charge to the total payment due. This tax would be nominal in nature
so as not to impose a burden upon the consumers. Spread thinly but
applying to a great population, the tax could accrue a large enough
sum to offset losses resulting from damages arising from litigation.
Similar to the proposal for imposing higher rates to offset losses, once
the affected corporations reached a point at which all damages were
paid and the funds accruing from the tax began resulting in residual
gains for the corporation, the tax would be lifted and the residual
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gains garnered from the tax by the state would be returned to the
consumers through a structured surplus disbursement. 123
C. Corporate Involvement in Emissions Trading Can Provide
Economic Gains that Would Help Offset Losses Resulting
from Adverse Litigation
While consumers could be forced to bear at least part of the brunt
of damages imposed on the corporations, ample situations also exist
that provide opportunities for the accrual of residual economic gain
that could be used by the corporations to offset losses from adverse
tort decisions. The most favorable of these prospects is investment
and trading in the carbon market.
1. The Basics of Emissions Trading for Corporations
Emissions trading (also called "cap-and-trade") poses a valid op-
portunity for individual and corporate economic gain in an era of en-
vironmental regulation.124 The concept of cap-and-trade is based
123. It must be noted that a tax would be extremely difficult to implement democratically in
certain states. To explain, it is posed for one to consider that in the specific case of ambulant air
emissions, the pollution does not spread in all directions upon its release from a source, but
instead moves with the wind, from west to east. As the pollution travels, therefore, so does the
environmental harm resulting from the pollution. Thus, if an electric company producing large
amounts of ambulant air emissions resides near Philadelphia, it is much more likely that New
York, New Jersey, and Delaware will encounter more of the company's air pollution than the
state of Pennsylvania. Therefore, the former states will likely suffer far more environmental
degradation as a result of these emissions. In this hypothetical situation, if the injured states
sued the Philadelphia-based company for damages in tort under the common law of nuisance
and subsequently won their case, the Philadelphia corporation would have to pay damages to
those states, thereby providing remedy for the citizens of the injured states. If Pennsylvania then
sought to impose a fractional tax upon its citizens in order to raise funds to keep the offending
corporation from being rendered bankrupt, the tax would essentially be used to aid citizens of
another state at the expense of Pennsylvanians.
Citizens of a state housing an offending corporation would likely be adamantly opposed to a
tax which provides their state citizens no direct tangible benefit, as they would see no immediate
upside to their loss of income. This disconnect between the immediate, dire economic realities
of the electric company in having to pay out damages and the citizenry paying to offset the
corporation's losses would result in political discord. Politicians, embroiled in seeking to balance
the need of the utility with the need of their constituency, would likely succumb to a stalemate
that would prevent the state from enacting its policy and prevent corporations from accumulat-
ing the funds necessary to remain operable.
However, such a situation as described above does not necessarily have to occur. By utilizing
intuitive policy planning and issue framing, the politicians in charge of implementing such a tax
could assuage the public's anger, thereby circumventing - or at least tempering -public dissen-
sion and allowing for corporate sustainability to occur.
124. Acid Rain Program, 40 C.F.R. §§ 72-73 (2006) (describing the Acid Rain Program); see
also Michael Hopkin, Emissions Trading: The Carbon Game, NATURE, Nov. 18, 2004, at 268,
270, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/joumal/v432/n7Ol5/full/432268a.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010).
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upon the theory that corporations, in instituting compliance measures
that align with mandatory pollution regulations, will choose the most
cost-effective means of compliance available.125 In essence, corpora-
tions will choose emissions reductions where the least expensive solu-
tions exist while opting to allow the continued production of emissions
that would be unduly expensive to reduce.126 At its simplest form,
emissions trading provides economic incentives for corporations to re-
duce their emissions and comply with restrictive emissions
standards. 127
Under normal circumstances for emissions trading, a governmental
administrative body will institute target levels of emissions as a guide-
line for corporations to reduce their emissions to environmentally fea-
sible levels.128 As emissions reduction targets are imposed, cap-and-
trade plans are implemented to minimize the costs on corporations in
meeting regulatory demands.129 The "cap" component of the cap-
and-trade system is essentially the limit on emissions itself, a threshold
that is methodically lowered until a corporation's emissions reach a
designated target level determined by the regulatory body imposing
the limitation.130 After the cap is established, the affected corpora-
tions are issued emission permits along with an equivalent number of
credits, which constitute an allowance.131 These allowances, which re-
present the right to produce a specific amount of emissions, cannot
cumulatively exceed the enforced cap level.132 If a company desires to
increase its emissions allowance, it must purchase credits from a cor-
poration that holds credits in excess of its needs.133 The purchase and
sale of these credits is the "trade" of the cap-and-trade system.134 At
its core, the trade is premised upon the notion that purchasers are
125. Environmental Defense Fund, The Cap and Trade Success Story (Feb. 12, 2007), http://
www.edf.org/page.cfm?taglD=1085.
126. Costs, Benefits, and a Roadmap for Cap and Trade, KNOWLEDGE@W.P.CAREY, (Jan. 7,
2010), http://knowledge.wpcarey.asu.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1847.
127. Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 125.
128. See Tom Curry, How a Carbon Permit System Would Work, MSNBC (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29395517.
129. Center for American Progress, Cap and Trade 101: What Is Cap and Trade, and How Can
We Implement It Successfully? (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/
capandtradel0l.html (discussing structural basis of a successful cap and trade program).
130. See ARNAUD BROH8, NICK EYRE, & NICHOLAS HOWARTH, CARBON MARKETS: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS GUIDE 43-46 (2009).
131. See CHRISTIAN EGENHOFER & THOMAS LEGGE, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING
IN EUROPE 28 (2002).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. BARRY LEONARD, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL Glossary-4 (2003).
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paying for the right to pollute beyond their mandated limit, while sell-
ers are concomitantly being recompensed for reducing their emissions
to a level beyond that which is required by the imposed limitations.135
This mechanism promotes active and competitive reduction of emis-
sions while concurrently reinforcing the valued corporate principles of
efficiency and cost-cutting. 3 6
Of interest to corporate entities as well is the fact that non-polluting
organizations, including environmental groups, may also involve
themselves in the cap-and-trade system by purchasing and selling
credits. 37 The ability of these non-polluting organizations to involve
themselves in cap-and-trade is important, as their participation allows
for the organizations to have a direct impact on the credit prices in the
marketplace and, resultantly, on the corporations themselves. Moreo-
ver, corporations have the option of donating their credits to non-cor-
porate entities for tax deductions.138 The flexibility gained from non-
polluting organization participation provides for additional variety of
options for the corporations in determining the most advantageous
economic policy in trading emissions while concomitantly allowing the
polluting corporations' opposition to have a stake in the corporations'
sustainability.
Furthermore, an emissions futures market currently exists, provid-
ing a tool for corporations to hedge their exposure to possible future
United States carbon policy and carbon allowance prices.139 While
the emissions futures market is still in its infancy, there are many ben-
efits to its existence with respect to the sustained viability of emissions
trading as a practical means of addressing corporate environmental
harms. Currently, in carbon markets alone, futures trading exists for
over twenty-five separate types of contracts, providing a panoply of
135. See EGENHOFER & LEGGE, supra note 131, at 28.
136. A prospectively viable exemplar of a domestic cap-and-trade system is the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern United States and parts of eastern Ca-
nada, which is designing and implementing a cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide emissions
from power plants in its member states. Pennsylvania currently is abstaining from RGGI mem-
bership and is participating solely as an observer. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Fact Sheet:
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RBBIFact_Sheet.pdf.
137. See National Resources Defense Council, Regulating Trading in the Carbon Market (Jan.
2009), http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/cap2.0/files/regulating.pdf.
138. See Bill Chase, Cap and Trade: The Economics of Carbon Trading, POLLUTION-FREE
PLANET FOUND., (May 2009), http://pfp100.us/candt.html.
139. Chicago Climate Futures Exchange Successfully Lists Futures Contracts Based on Emis-
sion Allowances Under Anticipated U.S. Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program,
CHI. CLIMATE FUTUREs EXCHANGE (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.greenfundpartners.com/
uploads/CCFENewsReleasewithGFP.pdf.
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options for corporations interested in investing in emissions futures.140
These futures offer alternatives to investing in basic cap-and-trade
contracts, allowing corporations to integrate emissions trading strate-
gies into their company policy creation.141 This is especially important
for utilities such as electric companies, as their utilization of the fu-
tures market will allow for the corporations to fix costs so they can
adequately price their product to yield an adequate rate of return, ul-
timately providing not only for the corporations' sustainability, but
also for long-term growth.
2. New Legislation that Could Affect the Emissions Market
The statutory landscape of domestic emissions trading is in a state
of constant flux, as the medium is a fledgling industry as compared to
traditional modes of investment. Recently, the House of Representa-
tives passed the American Clean Energy & Security Act (ACES),142
and the legislation is now preparing for consideration in the Senate.143
ACES is a comprehensive reformulation of domestic climate policy,
proposing, amongst other revisions, a federal cap-and-trade system.144
This legislation would render cap-and-trade not a voluntary choice for
corporations, but a mandated mechanism instituted by the govern-
ment in order to gradually reduce harmful emissions.145 While under
ACES, individual companies would be free to choose how they would
like to best utilize cap-and-trade in reducing their emissions, a com-
plete failure to reduce emissions would result in detrimental costs to
the corporation, such as fines.146
140. Chicago Climate Futures Exchange, Products Overview, http://www.ccfe.com/ccfe
Content.jsfid=91309 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
141. Jonatan Pinske, The Implementation of Emissions Trading in Companies, in EMISSIoNS
TRADING: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DECISION MAKING, AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 193, 203-
04 (Ralf Antes et al. eds., 2008).
142. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
143. See H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, available at http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454.
144. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). ACES would also require electric utility companies to
meet 20% of their electricity demand through renewable energy sources and energy efficiency
by 2020. The legislation would subsidize clean energy technologies while promoting energy effi-
ciency. Further, the bill would protect consumers from energy price increases. Id. The EPA has
estimated that the reductions in carbon pollution required by the legislation will cost American
families less than a postage stamp per day. The bill would require a 17% reduction in emissions
reduction from 2005 levels by 2020 and an 80% reduction in domestic emissions by 2050. Letter
from Douglas Elmendorf, Congressional Budget Office to Congressman Dave Camp (June 19,
2009) (online at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090620/cbowaxmanmarkey.pdf).
145. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
146. Id. It should also be noted that a similar legislation, the Clean Energy Jobs and Ameri-
can Power Act, was recently introduced into the Senate. S. 1799, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill,
similar to ACES, has an overall goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% (compared
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3. How Corporations Can Deal with the Legislation so as to
Create the Most Fiscally Beneficial Global Carbon Market
Of pertinent interest to the electric utility corporations affected by
American Electric is the possibility that if ACES is ratified by Con-
gress, the global carbon market could become the largest commodity
market in the world. 4 7 Such an emergence could also provide oppor-
tunity for favorable federal emissions regulations, with electric utility
corporations joining forces with financial corporations to create a
powerful lobby in the carbon market. The stars are already aligning
for such a union, as the presence of the financial lobby in climate leg-
islation has increased by roughly one hundred thirty representatives
since 2003.148 The financial firms, if they behave according to tradi-
tional capitalist tendencies,'149 will push for weak, pliable regulatory
standards. Such flimsy regulations would provide for greater opportu-
nity for the firms to exploit a nascent industry, thereby increasing the
chance for maximized gains by those involved in the market. 50 This
freedom from cumbrance could be a boon for the electric utility cor-
porations that are inherently involved in the trades, as the develop-
ment of a strategic investment policy in carbon trading that properly
exploits the weak market standards would allow these companies to
maximize their profits and residual fiscal gains while coming into com-
pliance with the federal emissions regulations imposed by Congress.
In short, the electric companies would be placed in an advantageous
economic position while the consumers, states, and land trusts would
be placed in an advantageous environmental position, thereby creat-
ing a de facto reciprocity of benefit.
with 2005 levels) by 2020, and by 83% by 2050. Id. The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power
Act lacks an economy-wide cap-and-trade system, as seen in ACES. Id. However, the bill
would force electric utilities to face limits on their greenhouse gas emissions by establishing a
market to allow the utilities to trade pollution permits. Of note, the primary utility industry
trade group, Edison Electric Institute, endorsed the bill. John M. Broder, Senate Gets a Climate
and Energy Bill, Modified by a Gulf Spill That Still Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 2010, at A18.
147. Current predictions estimate a thriving carbon futures market, with up to $2 trillion in
transactions and 180 million private contracts per year. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Green CAT Markets to be Largest in World (Apr. 2, 2010) (online at http:/
/www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/mediaadvisory061109.html).
148. Marianne Lavelle, The Climate Change Lobby: Carbon as a Commodity, CENTER FOR
PULIc INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/climateschange/
articles/entry/1179/.
149. For a discussion on the merits of a financial laissez-faire approach in allowing for the
traditional free market economy first proposed by Adam Smith, see KEVIN DowD, MONEY AND
THE MARKET: ESSAYS ON FREE BANKING 17-25 (2001).
150. Id.
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IV. THE EFFECTs OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC ON CORPORATE
LOBBYING FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE TO
EMISSIONS STANDARDS
While corporations impacted by the holding of American Electric
must actively look towards the immediate issue of minimizing the ad-
verse economic impact caused by compulsory emissions reforms by
utilizing the best possible measures available to offset losses accrued,
the corporations also must look to their lobby as a tool for effecting
favorable change. Lessons may be gleaned from comparing Tennessee
Copperi5 ' and Milwaukee 1152 and II.153 Namely, the corporations in
Tennessee Copper took an obstinate, archaic approach to addressing
and remedying the problems they faced in litigation, choosing to fight
their battle through prolonged litigation and opting for compliance
with only the bare minimum standards for operations mandated by
the Court. 154 This myopic, stale strategy resulted in both fiscal and
legal losses for the corporations 55 and could have been addressed in a
manner more advantageous for long-term corporate sustainability. In
contrast, the entities affected by Milwaukee I took a different ap-
proach, pushing for the institution of new legislation more favorable
to corporate needs that would adequately address their issue while
concomitantly supplanting the more unfavorable federal common
law.156 The past precedent of legislative change effected between the
holdings of Milwaukee I and II shows that lobbying can be a useful
tool if utilized effectively.
A. The Kyoto Protocol: Domestic Corporate
Concerns and Responses
Corporate lobbying played a massive role in the United States' de-
cision not to adopt the Kyoto Protocol ("the Protocol").'57 As a basis
point, the elemental foundations of the Protocol must be discussed.
The Protocol was the result of a series of conferences and summits
that began with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit Conference, where the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was
151. 237 U.S. 474.
152. 406 U.S. 91.
153. 451 U.S. 304.
154. See Tennessee Copper, 237 U.S. 474.
155. Id. at 477-78.
156. This new legislation was embodied in the 1972 FWPCA Amendments, which delineated
more specific bases by which polluters had to comply, thereby providing well-defined limits for
corporations to develop internal policies compliant with federal and state standards. See 33
U.S.C. 1251 et seq. (2006).
157. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1.
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adopted, and ended after a 1997 "Conference of the Parties" in Kyoto,
Japan. 58 The Protocol essentially serves as an international agree-
ment to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases.159 Its fundamental
premise was that developed countries, essentially the largest energy
users and greenhouse gas producers, should bear the brunt of reduc-
ing emissions to avoid climate change,160 and the Protocol specifically
required the United States to reduce emissions to seven percent below
1990 levels by 2012.161
Of pertinent interest is the fact that the Protocol allowed trading in
emissions. 162 Similar to the methodology behind corporate emissions
trading discussed above, the Protocol's emissions trading guidelines
prescribed that countries could buy the right to emit a certain amount
of carbon dioxide from countries that value money more than their
right to emit. 63 However, the Kyoto formulation of emissions trading
contained a number of caveats. For example, the Protocol required
the trading to involve either a reduction in emissions or an enhance-
ment of greenhouse gas removal that would be additional to any that
would otherwise occur.164 Furthermore, the country buying emissions
rights had to be in compliance with the Protocol, and any trading had
to be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of reducing
emissions. 65
1. American Legislative Reasoning for Not Adopting the Protocol
The United States, despite being a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol,
never ratified the concord.166 As the Protocol is non-binding unless
158. Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 177, 180 (2002).
159. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2.
160. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 11.
161. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO PROTOCOL
REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNTS 13 (2008),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccckprefmanual.pdf. In gen-
eral, the Protocol required developed countries to bring their total greenhouse gas emissions to
five percent less than they were in 1990. I.S. THAKUR, ENVIRONMENTAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: BA-
SIC CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 110 (2006).
162. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 17.
163. Eric Shaffner, Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting Out the Kyoto Protocol
to Its Economic Detriment? 37 ENvTL. L. 441, 454 (2007). The Kyoto Protocol emissions trading
system was patterned after the successful sulfur dioxide emissions trading system created as a
component of the U.S. Acid Rain Program instituted in the 1990's.
164. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6.1(d).
165. Id.
166. The United States' decision to be merely a signatory and not a full-fledged member na-
tion of the Protocol stems from the United States Senate's unanimous passage of the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, which addressed the belief that the United States should not be bound to a protocol
that did not include compulsory timetables for developing nations as well as industrialized na-
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ratified by an adoptive state government, 167 the United States' signa-
ture constitutes merely a symbolic gesture,168 pledging to stand with
other nations in expressing that climate change is a growing concern
that needs to be addressed and remedied in the near future so as to
protect the Earth's fragile ecosystem.
In lieu of adopting the Kyoto Protocol, the United States signed the
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
(APP).169 While technically a formal step towards the United States
embracing the revisionist goals of corrective climate change, the APP
failed to proffer an enforcement mechanism170 and therefore was tan-
tamount to another mere gesture by the United States, which increas-
ingly displayed isolationist tendencies with respect to economic
regulation 71 . Congress responded to the Kyoto Protocol and the
APP by proposing the America's Climate Security Act of 2007 (the
"Cap and Trade Bill"), 172 which pushed for greater United States
alignment with the Kyoto Protocol standards and goals. Calling for a
variety of reforms, the bill was slated to impose emission limits on
various industries, including the electric utility industry, while also
providing assistance both to the affected corporations and to the con-
sumers who would be affected by the corporate emissions restructur-
ing.173 However, the Cap and Trade bill stagnated in Congress in
2008, halted by the hazard of a faltering domestic economy along with
a strong push by electric utility lobby groups to avoid the imposition
of emissions caps.174
tions or that would ultimately result in economic harm to the United States. S. Res. 98, 105th
Cong. (as passed by the Senate, July 25, 1997). A list of current signatories to the Kyoto Proto-
col confirms that the United States has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol. See Status of Ratifi-
cation of the Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocollstatusofratification/items/2613.
php (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
167. Upon state ratification, the Kyoto Protocol legally binds a state to comport with its re-
duction scheme, whereas those states which have not ratified are not legally bound. See Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2-3.
168. Shaffner, supra note 163, at 448 n.52.
169. The United States adopted the APP on January 11-13, 2006. Of note, the APP allowed
member countries to set their own goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. See Charter:
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (Jan. 12, 2006), available at http://
www.app.gov/app/about/key/92865.htm.
170. See id.
171. WYATr M. ROGERS, JR., THIRD MILLENNIUM CAPITALISM: CONVERGENCE OF Eco-
NoMIc, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCEs 129-30 (2000).
172. S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
173. See id.
174. See Eric Roston, Earth Inc.: Warming Up to Green, TIME, Mar. 19, 2001, at B9, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,999499-1,00.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
It must be noted that some corporations have independently and proactively decided to enact
their own schemes to curb emissions within their respective companies. British Petroleum and
[Vol. 8:419
A PERILOUS CLIMATE
2. The Role of the Electric Utility Lobby
The electric utility lobby has long had a perceptible impact on do-
mestic legislation. Since 1998, electric utility lobbyist groups have
spent nearly $1.2 billion, rendering it the third most powerful indus-
trial lobby by expenditure. 175 Like most corporate lobbies, the elec-
tric utility lobby pushes for laissez-faire policies that allow for the
maximum force of capitalism to be attained, thereby rendering great
inflows of profits at limited short-term expense.'76 The lobby's power
has increased over the past decade, peaking in 2008 during a zenith of
hype over the Kyoto Protocol and slightly receding since.177 This
lobby had a great influence in the United States' decision not to adopt
the Kyoto Protocol in the late Nineties, as the proposed emissions re-
strictions would have devastated the industry by forcing it to expend
gross amounts of capital to comply with the stringent environmental
limitations in a short amount of time. 178
The electric companies named in American Electric are not divested
from the electric lobby efforts. In fact, the corporations have played
and continue to play a pivotal role. Over the last decade American
Electric contributed over $20 million to the electric utility lobby,179
while Xcel Energy spent over $15 million.' 80 Southern Company, one
of the largest contributors in the industry, spent over $90 million.18'
Furthermore, the lobby efforts in the areas of energy and the environ-
ment by the American Electric corporations and the electric utility in-
dustry in general have been steadily increasing as the decade has
progressed.182 In light of the American Electric holding, and in the
the Shell Oil Corporation have reportedly set up carbon reduction plans that exceed the Kyoto
percentages. However, these global corporations had a greater pressure to comply with the Pro-
tocol than the domestic electric utility corporations privy to the American Electric litigation.
175. Lobbying Spending Database: Top Entries (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.open
secrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=&indexType=i.
176. ROGERS, supra note 171, at 129.
177. Lobbying Spending Database: Electric Utilities 2009 (last updated July 26, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbylindusclient.php?year=2009&lname=EO8&id=.
178. CorpWatch: Corporate Campaign to Corrupt The Kyoto Protocol Continues After COP-
6 (Apr. 1, 2001), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=980.
179. Lobbying Spending Database: American Electric Power 2009 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=American+Electric+Power&year=2009.
180. Lobbying Spending Database: Xcel Energy 2009 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Xcel+Energy&year=2009.
181. Lobbying Spending Database: Southern Co. 2009 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Southern+Co&year=2009.
182. Lobbying Spending Database: Energy & Nuclear Power (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http:/
/www.opensecrets.org/lobby/issuesum.php?lname=Energy+%26+Nuclear+Power&year=a; Lob-
bying Spending Database: Environment & Superfund (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/lobbylissuesum.php?lname=Environment+%26+Superfund&year=a.
2010] 449
450 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
face of competitive lobbying in opposition to the electric utility com-
panies' interests as the Kyoto Protocol's reign reaches an end,183 the
electric utility industry must refocus its lobby efforts on the specific
purpose of refashioning the CAA so as to render it preemptive of the
national common law of nuisance. Concentrating on this specific goal
provides the best possibility of legislative reform that would void the
holding of American Electric.
B. Corporations Must Now Focus on the Clean Air Act so as to
Eliminate Tort Liability for Damages Under the Common
Law of Nuisance
When considering whether a statute preempts federal common law,
the Supreme Court must take "an assessment of the scope of the legis-
lation and whether the scheme established by Congress addresses the
problem formerly governed by federal common law."1 84 In order for
preemption to occur, the statute must speak directly to the issue in
question. 85 If Congress has not clearly addressed a particular issue,
the courts must apply federal common law.186
Many courts have mentioned that the CAA and FWPCA have
many analogous characteristics, alluding to the idea that the similar
statutory bases and purposes require similar judicial interpretation in
preempting the federal common law of nuisance. 87 However, the
CAA's current structure differs significantly from the amended
FWPCA that preempted the common law of nuisance in Milwaukee
II, a fact that likely was determinative as to how the Second Circuit
ruled in American Electric.'88 The FWPCA's standards originally
were not fully comprehensive and therefore were subsequently al-
tered after Milwaukee I to encompass all effluent emissions, rendering
the amended version of the FWPCA's statutory structure a suitable
archetype for preemption of the federal common law of nuisance.189
The majority opinion in Milwaukee II found it especially significant in
preempting the federal common law that under the amended
183. Exxon Outspends Clean-Energy Industry on Washington Lobbying (July 30, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=20601130&sid=aPuYDoceYMe0 (stating that
clean-energy companies spent $21.8 million on lobbying in 2008, five times as much as in 2006).
184. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315 n.8.
185. Id. at 315.
186. Id.; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985).
187. See, e.g., New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2nd Cir. 1981) (citing
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Nat'l Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. EPA, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
188. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006), with 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
189. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 99 (1992).
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FWPCA, rechristened the Clean Water Act, the EPA regulated every
instance of effluent emission.190 Conversely, under the CAA, the
states and the EPA do not have omnipresent control over all sources
of emissions, but only over the sources they collectively determine to
threaten the NAAQS.191 As the CAA is currently not all-encompass-
ing, and in fact more comparable to the original version of the
FWPCA, the electric utility lobby should take heed from past prece-
dent and aim to initiate favorable reforms, thereby rendering the stat-
ute fully inclusive so as to displace the common law and subvert the
holding of American Electric.
The use of legislative reform by corporations as a proactive measure
to supplant the common law of nuisance and combat adverse judicial
holdings has been successful in the past. As evidenced in the work by
the corporate lobby in influencing the amending of the FWPCA prior
to Milwaukee II, legislative reform can have a positive effect for cor-
porations that have been adversely adjudicated.192 Provided that the
electric utility lobby mobilizes quickly to induce favorable reform, the
industry could curtail losses and end up with a sympathetic statutory
construction for its practices.
V. CONCLUSION
The American Electric holding was a key victory for environmental
reform activists and a striking blow for the electric utility industry.
The holding is a defining moment in environmental adjudication that
could result in a flood of litigation by states, municipalities, and con-
servation trusts for redress of harms to the ambient air quality. The
corporations must be proactive in their preparation for a litigious cli-
mate by developing fiscal stratagems to best counteract the outflow of
capital through judicially imposed damages. Further, the American
Electric holding could prompt the impetus for domestic emissions pol-
icy reform. Utilizing the lessons of past precedent, the corporations
subject to impending lawsuits under the post-American Electric re-
gime can adequately prepare not only for impending actions under the
common law of nuisance, but also for instigating favorable legislative
reform.
190. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(d) (2006).
192. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1981).
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